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W(H)ITHER GLUCKSBERG?
RONALD TURNER*
ABSTRACT
This article is a tale of two significant United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting and applying the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that an asserted right to
physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the clause because it is not a right deeply rooted in this nation's history
and tradition. More recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court held that
state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the Due Process
Clause. In so holding, the Obergefell Court departed from Glucksberg’s
history-and-tradition analysis and instead applied an evolving,
generational approach in deciding the substantive due process issue
before it. Dissenting in Obergefell, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
argued that the majority had effectively overruled Glucksberg. A
different view was expressed in a 2017 speech by then-Judge and nowJustice Brett M. Kavanaugh in which he argued that Glucksberg stands
today as an important precedent insuring that the Court operates as a
court of law and not as an institution of social policy. This article
examines these differing views and several post-Obergefell decisions
shedding helpful but not dispositive light on this important aspect of
substantive due process jurisprudence and doctrine. As concluded
herein, and contrary to declarations and predictions of its demise,
Glucksberg was not overruled, effectively or otherwise, by Obergefell.
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INTRODUCTION
This article is a tale of two significant United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting and applying the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
Washington v. Glucksberg2 held that an asserted right to physicianassisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
clause, because that claimed right is not deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition. Obergefell v. Hodges3 held that state laws
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex violated the
clause. In so holding, the Court, noting Glucksberg’s history-andtradition analysis, concluded that while that approach may have been
appropriate in the context of physician-assisted suicide, it was not
consistent with the Court’s approach in other fundamental rights
decisions.4 Both cases were decided by 5-4 votes, with Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy casting the deciding vote in both rulings.
What remains of Glucksberg in the wake of Obergefell? Did
Obergefell overrule Glucksberg, as Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
2. 521 U.S. 702 (1997), discussed infra Part II.
3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), discussed infra Part IV.
4. See id. at 2602.
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argued in his Obergefell dissent?5 Or, as then-Judge and now Justice
Brett M. Kavanaugh observed in a post-Obergefell speech, does
Glucksberg stand “to this day as an important precedent, limiting the
Court’s role in the realm of social policy and helping to ensure that the
Court operates more as a court of law and less as an institution of social
policy[?]”6 These important questions have not been definitively
answered by the Court but have been considered in post-Obergefell
lower court rulings, shedding helpful light on this aspect of the Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence. Gleaned from those cases is a
provisional answer to this article’s w(h)ither Glucksberg query:
Glucksberg’s methodology has survived, as evidenced by courts’ and
judges’ post-Obergefell use of the Glucksberg two-step analysis.7
The article unfolds as follows. Part I’s prefatory and chronological
backdrop discusses the tradition referent and employment of legal
traditionalist methodology in the Court’s substantive due process
decisions. Part II examines Glucksberg, and Part III turns to postGlucksberg Court decisions first rejecting and subsequently applying
Glucksberg’s history-and-tradition approach. Obergefell is the focus of
Part IV. Part V, assessing the argument that Obergefell laid waste to and
has definitely replaced the Glucksberg methodology, surveys recent
post-Obergefell lower court decisions which continue to apply
Glucksberg in turning away substantive due process challenges to
certain governmental actions.
I. TRADITION, TRADITIONALISM, AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Tradition, understood here as “our name for [a] repository of
accustomed practices,”8 has long been a factor considered by the Court
and individual Justices in decisions addressing the constitutionality of
due process claims.9 The “central traditionalist idea is that one should
be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were
acting reflectively and in good faith, especially when those judgments

5. See infra notes 179 and 184 and accompanying text.
6. Brett M. Kavanaugh, From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist 16 (2017 Walter Berns Constitution Day Lecture), http://www.aei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/from-the-bench.pdf.
7. See infra Part V.
8. David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1991).
9. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo’s Feather: An Examination and
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental
Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2006) (discussing tradition’s role in Supreme Court
decisions).
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have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time.”10 Some jurists
view tradition as a limiting principle; that is, an objective criterion
preventing the substitution of judicial preferences for those of
legislators.11 For those who subscribe to the view that the Due Process
Clause “is generally tradition-protecting”12 and “suitably backwardlooking,”13 established and customary positions and practices are of
interest when the constitutionality of those positions and practices are
challenged.
A. Early Cases
An early exemplar of the Court’s reference to and focus on
tradition is found in Dred Scott v. Sandford,14 the “birthplace of the
controversial idea of substantive due process.”15 In concluding that
enslaved Africans and their descendants were not and could not be
citizens of the United States, Chief Justice Roger Taney looked to “the
legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the
Declaration of Independence” as well as “the public history of every
European nation.”16 Taney stated that the opinion that blacks were
“beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race . . . and . . . had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect” was “fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white
race [and was] regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics.”17
In its 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon,18 the Court opined that
constitutional questions “are not settled by even a consensus of present
public opinion,” and that where there is a debatable issue of fact “a
10. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
891 (1996).
11. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540 (2012).
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67 (1996).
13. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2004).
14. 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
15. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 40 (1997); see also AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE
LIVE BY 119 (2012) (the phrase substantive due process comes from judges “and the underlying
concept has been deployed by judges in some of the most notorious Court opinions in American
history, including the proslavery 1857 ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford”).
16. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. Chief Justice Taney stated that while the words “all men are
created equal” in the Declaration of Independence “would seem to embrace the whole human
family . . . it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration.” Id. at 410.
17. Id. at 407.
18. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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widespread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy of
consideration.”19 Twining v. New Jersey,20 holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not make the privilege against self-incrimination
applicable against the states, stated that what constitutes “due process
of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages
and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of
England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country.”21 In Twining, the Court
concluded that the privilege was not established in English law “during
the time when the meaning of due process was in a formative state and
before it was incorporated in American constitutional law.”22
Tradition was also referenced in Snyder v. Massachusetts,23 where
the Court held that a defendant did not have a due process right to be
present at a jury’s view of a crime scene. The state was “free to regulate
the procedures of its courts in accordance with its own conception of
policy and fairness unless in doing so it offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”24 A few years later, in Palko v. Connecticut,25 the Court
held that the privilege against double jeopardy26 did not apply to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice
Cardozo’s opinion for the Court concluded that due process protects
only those rights making up “the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.”27
Due process challenges to state regulation of education and
parental control of children also faced unsuccessful tradition-based
defenses. In Meyer v. Nebraska,28 the Court struck down a Nebraska
statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to students who
had not yet passed the eighth grade. Acknowledging that it had not
precisely defined “liberty,” the Court determined that that term
19. Id. at 420–21.
20. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
21. Id. at 100.
22. Id. at 107.
23. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
24. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
25. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled in part by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
27. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325, 326.
28. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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included, among other things, the right “to marry, establish a home and
bring up children.”29 It said: “The American people have always
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.”30 A
subsequent decision, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,31 applied Meyer in
ruling that an Oregon statute requiring public school attendance by
children between the ages of eight and sixteen “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”32
Accordingly, a state could not “standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only.”33
B. The 1960s
In the 1960s, the Court began to address the constitutionality of
state laws regulating certain reproductive choices and practices. In Poe
v. Ullman,34 the Court dismissed as not justiciable cases challenging a
Connecticut statute making it a crime to use or give medical advice
regarding the use of contraceptives. Justice John Marshall Harlan’s
influential dissent set out a balancing approach to be employed in
determining whether an asserted liberty interest was a fundamental
right protected by the Due Process Clause:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can
be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon the postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt
free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).

TURNER FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/17/2020 11:53 AM

W(H)ITHER GLUCKSBERG?

189

on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve
as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.35

Interestingly, Justice Harlan also observed that laws regarding
marriage and “forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon
that basis.”36
The Connecticut anti-use statute was again before the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut.37 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas,
held that the law unconstitutionally intruded on the right to marital
privacy located in the “penumbras . . . formed by emanations from those
guarantees” in the Bill of Rights “that help give them life and
substance.”38 Marriage is “older than the Bill of Rights” and “is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.”39 A concurring Justice Goldberg, emphasizing the
Ninth Amendment,40 observed that “judges are not left at large to
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they
must look to the ‘traditions and collective conscience of our people’ to
determine whether a principle is ‘so rooted there . . . as to be ranked as
fundamental.’”41 Disagreeing with Justice Goldberg’s resort to
tradition, a dissenting Justice Black, who found the Connecticut law
“abhorrent, just viciously evil, but not unconstitutional,”42 stated that
“the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget
which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted” in
the people’s conscience.43 It was not the Court’s duty “to keep the
Constitution in tune with the times,”44 he argued, for those who made
the Constitution “knew the need for change and provided for it” in
35. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Id. at 484 (discussing marital privacy created and bound by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments).
39. Id. at 486; see also Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (stating that
unmarried couples’ right to use contraceptives is protected by the Equal Protection Clause).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (brackets omitted)).
42. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 557 (2d ed. 1997).
43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 522.
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Article V.45 Justice Black said: “That method of change was good for
our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add that it is
good enough for me.”46
Tradition and historical practices did not carry the day in the
landmark Loving v. Virginia decision striking down state prohibition
and criminalization of interracial marriages.47 In its oral argument to
the Court, Virginia noted that “for over 100 years, since the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, numerous states—as late as 1956, the
majority of the states—and now even 16 states” prohibited interracial
marriage with no question raised as to the state’s authority to do so.48
That history-based plea was unavailing, as the Court held that the law
at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause and deprived individuals
of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. It held: “Under
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.”49
C. The 1970s
In Roe v. Wade,50 the Court referenced history in invalidating a
Texas criminal anti-abortion law. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the
Court examined “[a]ncient attitudes,” the origins of the Hippocratic
Oath, the common law, English statutory law, and state laws.51 He wrote
that “[a]t common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution,
and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was
viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently
in effect.”52 A woman’s choice whether to terminate a pregnancy “was
present in this country well into the 19th century,” Justice Blackmun
wrote, and “[e]ven later, the law continued for some time to treat less
punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.”53 Thus, he

45. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth procedures for the proposal and ratification
of a constitutional amendment).
46. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
48. Oral Argument, Loving v. Virginia (No. 395), in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1975).
49. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Id. at 130–41.
52. Id. at 140.
53. Id. at 141.
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concluded, the right to an abortion had not been traditionally
proscribed.
Dissenting, then-Justice Rehnquist grounded his argument in a
different account of history and tradition. He argued that a half-century
of restrictions on abortion in a majority of states was “a strong
indication . . . that the asserted right to an abortion is not ‘so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.’”54 Looking to 1868, the year of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, he noted that at least thirty-six state or
territorial laws limited abortion; that the laws of twenty-one states in
effect in 1868 were still in effect at the time of the Court’s 1973 decision;
and that the at-issue Texas law was first enacted in 1857 and essentially
the same law struck down by the Roe Court.55 Accordingly, in his view,
prohibiting and criminalizing abortion was not unconstitutional
because a number of states had prohibited the practice in the past.
Tradition and the history of the family was also an important aspect
of the Court’s decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a case
involving a due process challenge to a city ordinance limiting the
occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single nuclear family.56
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion acknowledged that in substantive due
process cases, “there is reason for concern lest the only limits to . . .
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at
the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment . . . .”57 Focusing on
tradition and the family, he observed that that tradition included
nuclear families as well as extended families of “uncles, aunts, cousins,
and especially grandparents sharing a household.”58 As those extended
families were part of this nation’s traditions and were “equally
deserving of constitutional protection,” the city could not
constitutionally standardize adults and children “by forcing them to
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.”59
54. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
55. See id. at 175–77.
56. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). Inez Moore lived in her East Cleveland home
with her son and two grandsons. The grandsons were first cousins and not brothers; one child
came to live with Moore and her son and his child after the death of the child’s mother. See id. at
496–97.
57. Id. at 502.
58. Id. at 504.
59. Id. at 505–06. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that the city
had failed to explain the need for an ordinance that would have allowed the homeowner to live
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Justice White, dissenting, criticized Justice Powell’s approach as
suggesting “a far too expansive charter . . . . What the deeply rooted
traditions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserve the
protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable.”60 In his
view, the “Judiciary, including this Court[,] is the most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or even the design of the Constitution.”61 Given that the Due Process
Clause as presently constructed “represents a major judicial gloss on its
terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers,” Justice White
argued that the Court “should be extremely reluctant to breathe still
further substantive content into” the clause in striking down welfarepromoting legislative enactments adopted by a state or city.62 Doing so
“unavoidably pre-empts” for the judiciary “another part of the
governance of the country without express constitutional authority.”63
D. The 1980s and 1990s
In the 1980s, the Justices’ references to history and tradition were
key aspects of a methodology known as legal traditionalism, the
interpretation of the Constitution “in accordance with the longstanding and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the
nation.”64 A traditionalist “interpreter looks at what decentralized and
representative bodies have done, over time, and treats their consensus
as authoritative . . . . [U]nless the text and history of the Constitution
are clear, judges should defer to the decisions of present-day
representative institutions.”65 Consider the legal traditionalist
with her grandchildren if they were brothers but not if they were cousins. See id. at 520 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment). Absent any showing of the ordinance’s substantial relation to the
city’s public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the law could not deprive Moore of a
fundamental right typically associated with the ownership of residential property: the right to
decide who may reside at that property. See id.
60. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 544.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1133 (1998).
65. Id. at 1136. Traditionalism is distinct from and should not be confused with another
interpretive methodology, originalism, a family of constitutional theories unified by the fixation
thesis (“the original meaning of constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision was
framed, ratified, and made public”), and the constraint principle (“constitutional practice should
be constrained by this fixed original meaning”). Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living
Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243,
1265–66 (2019). Originalism’s focus on fixed meaning thus differs from evolutionary
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approach and application in three significant substantive due process
cases.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,66 a five-Justice majority held that a Georgia
anti-sodomy law as applied to two men did not violate the Due Process
Clause. Justice White’s majority opinion asked the following question:
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time.”67 Answering “no,” Justice White looked to and relied
on the “ancient roots” of prohibitions of “homosexual sodomy”;
common law criminalization of sodomy; laws prohibiting sodomy in the
thirteen original states ratifying the Bill of Rights in 1791; criminal
sodomy laws in effect in 32 of the 37 states when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868; the proscription of sodomy in all fifty
states prior to 1961, the year in which Illinois decriminalized consensual
and private sexual conduct between adults; and the fact that at the time
of the Court’s 1986 decision, twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia criminalized sodomy performed in private and between
consenting adults.68 Justice White concluded that “[a]gainst this
background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition or implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty is, at best, facetious.”69 Rejecting this traditionalist
approach and conclusion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the
Court’s prior rulings made clear that the fact that a state traditionally
viewed a specific practice as immoral was not sufficient grounds for
forbidding the practice; “neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”70
Subsequently, the Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D.71 held that a
California law presuming that a child born to a married woman was a
traditionalism “which draws its normative authority” from historical practice. John C. Jeffries, Jr.
& Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
1211, 1241 (1998).
66. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
67. Id. at 190.
68. Id. at 192–94.
69. Id. at 194 (quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, concurring, stated
that the condemnation of homosexual conduct was “firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards.” Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). “To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching.” Id. at 197.
70. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 216 n.9 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)) (noting that “miscegenation was once treated as a crime similar to sodomy”).
71. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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child of the marriage did not violate the due process rights of the child’s
biological father, who was not married to the mother and sought
parental and visitation rights. Writing for a plurality of the Court,
Justice Antonin Scalia declared that the purpose of the Due Process
Clause “is to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside
important traditional values—not to enable this Court to invent new
ones.”72 He asked whether the relationship between the biological
father and the child “had been treated as a protected family unit under
the historic practices of our society, or whether on any basis it has been
accorded special protection” and thought “it impossible to find that it
has.”73 In Justice Scalia’s view, the pertinent tradition recognizing the
common law presumption of legitimacy was found in a 1569 book
written by Bracton, in Blackstone’s and Kent’s respective
commentaries, and in a 1957 American Law Reports annotation on the
presumption of the legitimacy of children conceived and born in
wedlock.74
As Michael H. asserted the right to a judicial declaration that he
was the natural father of the child and sought to obtain parental
prerogatives, Justice Scalia instructed that the father had to establish,
“not that our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his
circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally
accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not traditionally
denied them.”75 For Scalia, it was “ultimately irrelevant” that thenextant law in a number of states appeared to allow the natural father a
theoretical power to rebut the marital presumption.76 Not aware of a
single case awarding substantive parental rights to the natural father
conceived in and born into a marital unit embracing the child, Justice
Scalia concluded: “This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights
qualifying as liberty interests are made.”77

72. Id. at 122 n.2.
73. Id. at 124.
74. See id. at 124–26 and sources cited. Responding to Justice Scalia’s identification of the
pertinent tradition, Justice Brennan argued that accord on that point would require agreement
with regard to when “a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty
and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer.” Id. at 138 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Further, Justice Brennan argued that “it would be comforting to believe that a
search for ‘tradition’ involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring through
dusty volumes on American history”; he “would not stop . . . at Bracton, or Blackstone, or Kent,
or even the American Law Reports . . .” Id. at 137.
75. Id. at 126.
76. Id. at 127.
77. Id.
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In a footnote joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
set out a methodology governing the identification of the pertinent
tradition in due process cases: “We refer to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.”78 Citing Bowers v. Hardwick,79 he
argued that this methodology was not novel, and that consulting the
most specific tradition was necessary to avoid the “imprecise guidance”
of general traditions that would allow judges to dictate and not discern
society’s views.80 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by Justice
Kennedy, declined to adopt this approach, arguing that it “sketche[d] a
mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause . . . that may be somewhat
inconsistent with our past decisions in this area.”81 Citing Loving v.
Virginia82 and other Court decisions, Justice O’Connor argued that in
those cases the Court characterized rights-protecting traditions “at
levels of generality that might not be the most specific level
available.”83 Citing Justice Harlan’s Poe v. Ullman dissent,84 she did not
“foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode
of historical analysis.”85
The Due Process Clause, as interpreted by the Court in Bowers and
Michael H., was grounded in not only decades-old but centuries-old
views and positions applied to twentieth-century claims of individual
rights. Given the traditionalist methodology employed in those
decisions, modern-day challenges to certain governmental restrictions
on individuals’ actions and conduct would fall and fail in the face of
Court-determined history and tradition.
The Court took an anti-traditionalist turn, however, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.86 Reaffirming the
central holding of Roe v. Wade,87 the Justices again discussed whether
and how tradition should be considered and used in deciding
substantive due process cases. A joint opinion for a plurality of the
78. Id. at 127 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed supra note 66 and accompanying text.
80. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
81. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
84. Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
85. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
86. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Court, authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
responded to Justice Scalia’s Michael H. call for referring to the most
specific level at which a tradition protecting or denying protection to a
claimed right can be identified.88 In their view, it is “tempting . . . to
suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices,
defined at the most specific level, that were protected against
government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified . . . . But such a view would be inconsistent
with our law.”89 Citing the Ninth Amendment, the joint opinion stated:
“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth
Amendment protects.”90
Grounding its analysis in Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent,91 the joint
opinion remarked that the “inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting
the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition
courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are
not susceptible of expression as a simple rule.”92 Prior Court decisions
protecting individuals’ “personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, children rearing, and
education”93 involved “the most intimate and personal choices a person

88. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
89. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (joint opinion) (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127–28 n.6 (opinion
of Scalia, J.)).
90. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848; see also id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (stating that liberty should not be determined on the
basis of state practices existing at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment).
91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (joint opinion). In his 2006 book, then-Judge and now-Justice Neil
Gorsuch commented on the difficulties of the “reasoned judgment” test:
Are judges any more competent at the task (or deserving of any more deference) than
legislators? How does substantive due process doctrine differ from outright judicial
choice, or what is sometimes derisively labeled “legislation from the bench”? How
many moral philosophers actually agree, after all, about what metaphysical imperatives
such as “autonomy” entail? One might even ask whether it is bold enough to hold that
the procedurally oriented language of the due process guarantee contains the
enumerated substantive rights of the Bill of Rights; does going any further—holding
that the clause is also the repository of other substantive rights not expressly
enumerated in the text of the Constitution or its amendments, and thus entirely
dependent for their legitimacy solely on the “reasoned judgment” of five judges—
stretch the clause beyond recognition?
NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 77 (2006).
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy,” and
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.94

This tradition—the reasoned judgment of courts considering this
conception of liberty—is antithetical to the traditionalist
methodologies of Bowers and Michael H.
Reiterating the historical analysis of the abortion rights issue set
out in his Roe dissent,95 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that “it can
scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively
unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classification of the
right to abortion as ‘fundamental’ under the Due Process Clause.”96
And Justice Scalia rejected the joint opinion’s reasoned judgment
approach and conception of liberty as protecting intimate and personal
choices central to an individual’s dignity and autonomy. Citing Bowers
v. Hardwick,97 he argued that the same judgment could be applied to
same-sex sexual intimacies, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, “all of
which can constitutionally be proscribed because it is our
unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proscribable. It is
not reasoned judgment that supports the Court’s decision; only
personal predilection.”98 The “American people love democracy and
the American people are not fools,” Justice Scalia opined, and as long
they and the Court thought that the Justices were doing “essentially
lawyers’ work” the “public pretty much left us alone.”99 But if the
Court’s adjudication process is primarily one of making value
judgments and ignoring a “long and clear tradition clarifying an
ambiguous text,” “then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards
us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different.”100

94. Id.
95. See id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 952–53.
97. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed supra note 66 and accompanying text.
98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 1000.
100. Id. at 1000–01.
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II. REJECTING POE: WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
As just discussed, Casey embraced Justice Harlan’s Poe balancing
approach and called for the Court’s reasoned judgment in its
interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause. Five years
later, a majority of the Court employed a different historical and
formulaic substantive due process analysis in Washington v.
Glucksberg.101
The Glucksberg Court addressed the question of whether a
Washington state statute prohibiting a person from knowingly causing
or aiding another person to attempt suicide102 violated a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult’s right to commit suicide with the
assistance of a physician. Applying what is now known as the
“Glucksberg Two-Step,”103 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas)
considered two primary features of what the Chief Justice called the
Court’s “established” substantive due process methodology.104 First, the
Due Process Clause “protects those fundamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither his liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”105
Second, the Court requires a “careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.”106 An asserted right satisfying both
prongs of the test is deemed a fundamental right triggering strict
scrutiny judicial review; a claimed right not meeting the test is subject
to deferential rational-basis review.
Considering first the “careful description” prong of the Glucksberg
analysis, Rehnquist noted that those challenging the Washington law
asserted a “liberty to choose how to die,” a right to “control of one’s
final days,” “the right to choose a humane, dignified death,” and “the
liberty to shape death.”107 Rejecting those descriptions of the claimed

101. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
102. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1).
103. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1488 (2008).
104. Glucksberg, 512 U.S. at 703.
105. Id. at 721 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 192, 194 (1986) (concluding that an asserted “fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in
acts of consensual sodomy” was “facetious” as it was not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition” and was not “implicit in the concept or ordered liberty”), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
106. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 722.
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liberty interest, he instead framed the question as “whether the ‘liberty’
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”108
Turning to the Bowers-like history-and-tradition prong of the
Glucksberg test, Rehnquist concluded that (his framing of) the at-issue
right did not have “any place in our Nation’s traditions.”109 He noted
that “for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition
has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisted
suicide”;110 the American colonies and early states prohibited assisted
suicide as did most states when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868;111 and in recent years states had reexamined and
generally reaffirmed assisted suicide proscriptions.112 Given this
“consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the
asserted right and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for
terminally ill, mentally competent adults,” the Chief Justice concluded
that invalidating the Washington statute would “reverse centuries of
legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State.”113 Accordingly, the claimed right was not
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition and was therefore
“not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.”114
Rehnquist then concluded that the Washington statute survived
rational-basis review because it was reasonably related to the following
state interests: preserving human life; protecting the medical
profession’s integrity and ethics; protecting the poor, the elderly, and
the disabled from abuse and neglect; and avoiding the risk that
permitting assisted suicide could be a pathway to both voluntary and
involuntary euthanasia.115 The Court therefore held that Washington’s
physician-assisted suicide ban did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment on its face or as applied to competent and terminally ill
108. Id. at 723. Formulating a different inquiry, a concurring Justice David H. Souter, relying
on Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent, framed the pertinent question as whether the challenged law “sets
up one of those ‘arbitrary impositions’ or ‘purposeless restraints’ at odds with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
109. Id. at 723 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 711.
111. See id. at 714–15.
112. See id. at 716.
113. Id. at 723.
114. Id. at 728.
115. See id. at 728–35.
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adults seeking death-hastening medications prescribed by their
doctors.116
The history-and tradition methodology employed in Glucksberg is
fundamentally different from Casey’s balancing/reasoned judgment
analysis. The approach is so different that scholars plausibly argued at
that time that Glucksberg repudiated Casey’s methodology and
assumed the mantle of the controlling authority in subsequent
substantive due process cases.117
III. LAWRENCE’S MOVE AWAY FROM, AND MCDONALD’S RETURN
TO, GLUCKSBERG
A. Lawrence v. Texas
The view that due process traditionalist analysis governed the
Court’s interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause in
substantive due process cases was not followed in Lawrence v. Texas.118
There, the Court held that a Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate
sexual conduct engaged in by two persons of the same sex violated the
Due Process Clause. Writing for the Lawrence Court and opening his
opinion with his conception of “liberty,”119 Justice Kennedy did not ask
the question posed by the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick: “whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”120
He instead asked whether individuals “were free as adults to engage in
the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”121

116. See id. at 735.
117. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1557–60 (2000) (noting that
Glucksberg effectively renders the Casey framework unpersuasive).
118. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
119. See id. at 562. Kennedy wrote:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or
other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And
there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State
should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.
120. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see also supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (Bowers’s framing of the Court’s inquiry “discloses the Court’s
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Deeming it necessary to reconsider Bowers’s holding and making no
mention of Glucksberg—in which he joined the majority opinion in
full122—Justice Kennedy disagreed with Bowers’s conclusion that antisodomy laws have “‘ancient roots.’”123 Finding “no longstanding history
in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct
matter,” he held that “early American sodomy laws were not directed
at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative
sexual activity more generally.”124
Justice Kennedy then employed a desuetude analysis125 and found
significant the absence of a record of enforcement of anti-sodomy laws
against consenting adults privately engaging in such conduct. As the
infrequency of prosecutions “ma[de] it difficult to say that society
approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment” of the conduct, the
longstanding criminalization of homosexual sodomy relied upon in
Bowers “[wa]s as consistent with a general condemnation of
nonprocreative sex as it [wa]s with an established tradition of
prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.”126 Moreover,
state-law criminalization of same-sex intimate conduct did not occur
until the 1970s, with nine states prohibiting same-sex sexual relations
and five of those states later abolishing the proscription.127 Justice
Kennedy concluded that “the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers
are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate. Their historical premises are
not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”128
Having questioned the accuracy of Bowers’s historical account,
Justice Kennedy turned to Bowers’s traditionalist analysis. He did not
look back, as did the Bowers Court, to colonial times, 1791, 1868, or

failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” and “demeans the claim that the individual
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse”); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 567.
122. See Kenji Yoshino, Comment, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129
HARV. L. REV. 147, 153–54 (2015) (noting that the Court ought to have proclaimed that Bowers
was wrongly decided and did so in Glucksberg).
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192).
124. Id. at 568.
125. On desuetude, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 109 (1999) (“Citizens may not be prosecuted under laws that that were
enforced long ago, are regularly violated in practice, and are invoked only on a sporadic and
highly selective basis . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?: Of Autonomy,
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27–28 (2003).
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570.
127. See id. at 570–71.
128. Id. at 571.
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other time periods. In his view, the appropriate temporal period was
“our laws and traditions of the past half century,” and he found therein
“an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.”129 He believed that “[h]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive
due process inquiry.”130 Justice Kennedy opined that the
aforementioned emerging awareness was evidenced by, among other
things, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, a 1981
European Court of Human Rights decision holding that laws
prohibiting same-sex sexual intimacy violated the European
Convention on Human Rights,131 and the post-Bowers reduction in the
number of anti-sodomy state laws from twenty-five to thirteen, with
four states specifically forbidding homosexual sodomy.132
For the foregoing and other reasons, Justice Kennedy concluded,
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.
It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should
be and now is overruled.”133 In so concluding, he noted that the case
before the Court did not involve minors or persons injured, coerced, or
in relationships in which consent could not be easily refused, or
prostitution or public conduct.134 Nor did the case involve the question
“whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”135 As the Texas
statute furthered no legitimate state interest justifying intrusion into
the individual’s person and private life, the Court invalidated the law.
Justice Kennedy closed his opinion with the following observation:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have
been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can
see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact only serve

129. Id. at 572.
130. Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
131. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 52 (1981).
132. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573; see also id. at 572–73 (referring to the British Parliament
committee’s 1963 Wolfenden Report recommending the repeal of laws punishing homosexual
conduct and the enactment of the recommendations’ substance in 1967).
133. Id. at 578.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.136

In overruling Bowers, Justice Kennedy did not mention Glucksberg,
which was an interesting omission given that Glucksberg employed the
same history-and-tradition methodology used in the interred Bowers.
Furthermore, Lawrence did employ its own backward-looking
approach, focusing on the half century preceding the Court’s decision
in which the Court found an “emerging awareness” that
constitutionally protected liberty includes adults’ decisions about their
private sexual lives.137 What was constitutionally permissible in 1986—
the criminalization of private same-sex sexual intimacies—was
constitutionally impermissible in 2003.
A vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that liberty was constrained by
the Texas law and by “laws prohibiting prostitution, recreational use of
heroin, and, for that matter, working more than 60 hours per week in a
bakery.”138 That restraint of liberty was not problematic, he argued, as
the state may deprive persons of liberty through the due process of
law.139 Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s substantive due process
doctrine prohibits state infringement of fundamental liberty interests
unless that interest is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. Under Glucksberg, “only fundamental rights
qualify for this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ protection—that is,
rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’”140 Adhering to Bowers’ history-and-tradition analysis,
Justice Scalia rejected Justice Kennedy’s emerging awareness approach
and focus on the half-century preceding the Lawrence decision. An
“‘emerging awareness’ does not establish a ‘fundamental right,’” he
argued, and “is by definition not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and traditions . . . Constitutional entitlements do not spring into
existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal
sanctions on certain behavior.”141

136. Id.
137. See supra note 129 129and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referencing the more than sixty working hour per week
restriction at issue in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 593 (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 478 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
141. Id. at 598 (brackets omitted).
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Justice Scalia also responded to Justice Kennedy’s statement that
Lawrence did not involve the question whether any relationship
entered into by homosexual persons had to be formally recognized by
government:142
Do not believe it . . . . Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned . . . . This case “does not
involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the
belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions
of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures
us, this is so.143

B. McDonald v. City of Chicago
So, did Glucksberg survive Lawrence? In McDonald v. City of
Chicago, the Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms, recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller,144 is fully
applicable to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause.145 Justice
Alito’s majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,146 quoted Glucksberg and answered in
the affirmative the question whether the right to keep and bear arms
was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”147 Alito
wrote that “[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal
systems from ancient times to the present day,”148 and Heller makes it
clear that this is a historical and traditional right.149
Justice Alito traced the origins of the claimed right from the 1689
English Bill of Rights to Blackstone’s 1765 assertion that “the right to
keep and bear arms was ‘one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen’”
to the American colonies.150 The right “was considered no less
fundamental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights,” with

142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
143. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
145. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (ruling that Heller “unmistakably”
suggests that the right to bear arms is binding on the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
146. Id. at 748.
147. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))
(internal quotations omitted).
148. Id. at 768 (footnote omitted).
149. See id.
150. Id.
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nine states adopting state constitutional provisions protecting the
individual right to keep and bear arms between 1789 and 1820, joining
four other states that adopted Second Amendment analogues prior to
ratification of the Bill of Rights.151 Justice Alito’s opinion continued
into the 1850s, past the Civil War and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of
1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to the proposed and ratified
Fourteenth Amendment.152 In 1868, the year of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, “22 of the 37 States in the Union had state
constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and
bear arms,” as did state constitutions adopted during Reconstruction
by former states of the Confederacy.153 “In sum,” Justice Alito
concluded, “it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”154 Per
Glucksberg, he examined what he determined to be the relevant and
deeply rooted tradition and history in answering the due process
question presented in McDonald.
In the almost twenty-five years beginning with Bowers and ending
with McDonald, the Court (1) employed a traditionalist methodology
in rejecting a substantive due process challenge to the criminalization
of same-sex sexual conduct (Bowers); (2) declared that the outer limits
of the substantive sphere of liberty were not marked by the Bill of
Rights or by state practices at the time of the 1868 ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Casey); (3) looked to and relied on state
practices when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified as part of a
Bowers-like history-and-tradition approach in rejecting a substantive
due process challenge to a prohibition of physician-assisted suicide
(Glucksberg); (4) overruled Bowers in another case involving the
constitutionality of state criminalization of same-sex sexual intimacies
(Lawrence); and (5) cited Glucksberg and employed the history-andtradition methodology in holding that the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms for purposes of self-defense was incorporated
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment (McDonald).
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in the nontraditionalist Casey and Lawrence decisions, yet also in the
traditionalist Glucksberg and McDonald rulings. Given those votes,
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 768–69.
See id. at 770–77.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
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how Justice Kennedy would treat and what he would say about
Glucksberg in the Court’s marriage equality decision were important
matters of legal and public interest.
IV. OBERGEFELL
In its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,155 the Supreme
Court held that state laws banning marriage between persons of the
same sex violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.156
In so holding, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a five-Justice majority
(joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) departed from Glucksberg’s historyand-tradition approach.
Recall that the first Glucksberg prong determines the issue of the
fundamentality of an asserted liberty interest by reference to the
nation’s deeply rooted history and traditions.157 Not using that
approach, Justice Kennedy, quoting Justice Harlan’s Poe v. Ullman
dissent, observed that the “identification and protection of
fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret
the Constitution. That responsibility, however, ‘has not been reduced to
any formula.’”158 “History and tradition guide and discipline this
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries,” Justice Kennedy
continued, and respecting and learning from history does not mean that
“the past alone . . . rule[s] the present.”159 In a passage similar to one he
wrote in Lawrence,160 Justice Kennedy wrote:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own
times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter protecting the right of all to enjoy liberty as
we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a
claim to liberty must be addressed.161

155. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
156. The Court also held that laws prohibiting same-sex couples’ right to marry “abridge
central precepts of equality” and violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 2604.
157. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
158. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)).
159. Id.
160. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
161. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
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This due process approach entrusting to future generations the task of
determining the meaning of “liberty” in their own times is the antithesis
of “liberty” defined and cabined by Glucksberg’s formulaic historyand-tradition approach.
Justice Kennedy then addressed the respondents’ argument that
Glucksberg’s “careful description” prong required framing the
petitioners’ claim as one seeking not the right to marry, but “a new and
nonexistent ‘right to same-sex marriage.’”162 He conceded that
Glucksberg had called for a circumscribed definition of liberty in the
context of the right to physician-assisted suicide asserted in that case.
While that approach “may have been appropriate”163 in analyzing that
issue, “it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and
intimacy.”164 Loving v. Virginia165 concerned marriage, not interracial
marriage; Turner v. Safley166 marriage, not inmates’ right to marry; and
Zablocki v. Redhail167 marriage, not a father with unpaid child support’s
right to marry. In each of those cases, the Court considered the “right
to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient
justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”168
Moreover, Justice Kennedy made clear his view that the past did
not control the Court’s 2015 consideration and resolution of the samesex marriage issue. “If rights were defined by those who exercised them
in the past,” he wrote, “then received practices could serve as their own
continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once
denied. This Court has rejected that approach, both with respect to the
right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.”169 While the right to
marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, “rights come
not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that
remains urgent in our own era.”170 Kennedy believed that in this era, at
this time, the right to marry was a fundamental right, and states that

162. Id. at 2602 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 8, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (No. 14-556)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
166. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
167. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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deprive same-sex couples of that liberty violate the Due Process
Clause.171
Dissenting Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, remarked that “for millennia and across civilizations[,]”
marriage referred to the union of a man and a woman, and that at the
time of the nation’s founding marriage was understood as a voluntary
compact between husband and wife.172 The Framers entrusted to the
states the subject of husband-wife domestic relations, every state
defined marriage “in the traditional, biological way,” and nineteenthcentury dictionaries and early Court opinions defined marriage as the
union of a man and a woman.173
Emphasizing the “need for restraint in administering the strong
medicine of substantive due process,” Chief Justice Roberts cited two
Court decisions as exemplars of the Court exceeding its judicial role.
First, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,174 the Court acted on its conceptions of
liberty and property in invalidating the Missouri Compromise. And
Lochner v. New York175 struck down a New York law establishing
maximum hours for bakery employees because the Court saw “no
reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate
as a health law.”176 The Chief Justice stated that Dred Scott’s holding
and approach177 “was overruled on the battlefields of the Civil War and
by constitutional amendment after Appomattox,” only to reappear in
Lochner before the Court eventually recognized its error of
“converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates” and
discarded the doctrine.178
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts complained that Obergefell
effectively overruled Glucksberg, “the leading modern case setting the
bounds of substantive due process.”179 In so doing, he argued, the Court
employed the discredited Lochner methodology in an opinion

171. See id. at 2604.
172. See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2614.
174. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
175. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
176. Id. at 58.
177. In the view of one writer, Chief Justice Roberts suggested “that the majority in Obergefell
was imposing its own view of liberty on the American people” just as Chief Justice Roger Taney’s
Dred Scott opinion “imposed his view of slavery. He implied that Obergefell was just as
egregious.” JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE
JOHN ROBERTS 300 (2019).
178. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617, 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2621.
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“rest[ing] on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and
that it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to
deny them this right.”180 Equating that conclusion with the “naked
policy preferences adopted in Lochner,” the Chief Justice wrote that
the majority’s approach “is dangerous for the rule of law . . . . The Court
today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but
actively repudiates it, preferring to live in the heady days of the here
and now.”181 In his view, an immodest and unrestrained Court was
insufficiently sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and
unaccountable, and are not “attuned to the lessons of history” and what
it means when judges exceed their appropriate bounds.182 Like judges,
a pretentious “present generation” has supposed that they “are the
ones chosen to burst the bonds” of “thousands of years” of the
traditional institution of marriage.183
V. GLUCKSBERG, POST-OBERGEFELL
As previously noted, Chief Justice Roberts argued that Obergefell
effectively overruled Glucksberg, “the leading modern case setting the
bounds of substantive due process.”184 Noting the Chief Justice’s
observation on this point, Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued that
“[a]fter Obergefell, it will be much harder to invoke Glucksberg as
binding precedent” and that Obergefell “seems to have laid waste to
the entire Glucksberg edifice.”185 Agreeing with Professor Yoshino,
Professor Laurence Tribe has written that Obergefell “has definitively
replaced” the Glucksberg test “with the more holistic inquiry of Justice
Harlan’s justly famous 1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman . . . .”186 However,
as previously noted, in 2017 then-Judge and now-Justice Kavanaugh
expressed a different view regarding Glucksberg’s post-Obergefell
180. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
181. Id. at 2621, 2622–23.
182. Id. at 2626.
183. Id. In a separate dissent, Justice Alito, quoting Glucksberg, argued that to “prevent five
unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the American people, the
Court has held that ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect only
those rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. at 2640 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
184. Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
185. Yoshino, supra note 122, at 162, 166.
186. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 16
(2015); see also Alexis M. Piazza, The Right to Education After Obergefell, 43 HARBINGER 62
(Apr. 2, 2019) (noting although Obergefell did not expressly overrule Glucksberg, “there is little
doubt that [Glucksberg] rests on fragile ground”).
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status, remarking that to the then-present day Glucksberg is an
important precedent ensuring that the Court operates as a court of law
and not as an institution of social policy.187
Those views raise an important question: did Glucksberg survive
Obergefell? In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy reasoned that while
Glucksberg may have been appropriate in the physician-assisted
suicide context in which it was applied, it was inconsistent with the
approach taken by the Court in substantive due process cases involving
marriage and intimacy.188 Under that view, Obergefell did not expressly
overrule Glucksberg, leaving the Court’s 1997 decision in the physicianassisted-suicide jurisprudential and precedential silo. But aspects of the
Obergefell majority opinion could be read and understood as rejecting
Glucksberg’s formulaic fundamental rights analysis. For instance,
Justice Kennedy declared that history and tradition guide, but do not
set, the outer boundaries of the Court’s substantive due process
methodology and recognized—indeed endorsed—the need for and
propriety of generational determinations of the meaning of “liberty.”
Whether and to what extent Glucksberg lives post-Obergefell is an
open question awaiting future Court analysis and resolution. In the
meantime, one can look to post-Obergefell lower court decisions for
guidance. For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Reyna v. Hott189 considered
plaintiffs’ argument that their asserted substantive due process right to
family unity precluded Immigration and Customs Enforcement from
transferring parents from a facility near their children to one farther
away. While the plaintiffs relied on Obergefell as support for their
position, the court did not agree. Finding no precedent recognizing the
asserted right and citing Glucksberg, the court concluded that it “was
hardly free to create a new substantive due process right . . . .”190 The
court thus declined to recognize the claimed right in the absence of
objective criteria for assessing the strength of family ties, as the
enforcement of such a right would rest upon the subjective judgments
of judges, “just the circumstance about which the Supreme Court
advised utmost caution in Glucksberg.”191

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text.
921 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 211.
Id.
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Another Fourth Circuit decision, D.B. v. Cardall,192 held that the
federal Office of Refugee Settlement’s refusal to release a child to his
mother’s custody because it deemed her incapable of providing for the
child’s physical and mental well-being did not violate the mother’s
substantive due process rights. Acknowledging Obergefell’s statement
that the identification of rights implicating substantive due process
“has not been reduced to any formula,”193 the court opined that, at a
minimum, rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”
are included.194 The denial of the mother’s custody request based on the
determination that she was incapable of caring for the child did not
deprive her of a deeply rooted right and fundamental liberty interest.195
In Parrino v. Price,196 the Sixth Circuit rejected a pharmacist’s
substantive due process claim against the federal government. The
pharmacist pled guilty to the crime of introducing misbranded drugs
into interstate commerce and was excluded from participation in
federal health programs for at least five years.197 The pharmacist alleged
that the exclusion deprived him of a protected liberty interest in his
good name and reputation protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.198 Relying on Glucksberg, the Sixth Circuit stated that
substantive due process “protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”199 The
pharmacist had no fundamental right to participate in the programs.200
The Sixth Circuit also rejected a substantive due process claim in
another case which involved claims that individuals’ inclusion on a
government list designating them for enhanced security screening
before they were allowed to board flights infringed their fundamental
rights to travel and harmed their reputations.201 Again citing
192. 826 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2016).
193. Id. at 740 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598).
194. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
195. Id. at 741; see also Dawson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs. of Jefferson Cty., 732 F. App’x 624
(10th Cir. 2018) (asserting plaintiff’s right to be free from pretrial detention after paying a
required bond and waiting to be fit with a GPS monitor was not deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition and was therefore not a fundamental liberty interest).
196. 869 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2017).
197. Id. at 395.
198. Id. at 396; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (1791) (“No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
199. Parrino, 869 F.3d at 397 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 F.3d at 720–21).
200. Id.
201. Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2017).
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Glucksberg and quoting the Court’s deeply rooted in history and
tradition language, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to
adequately allege a violation of their fundamental rights.202
In another post-Obergefell case, Aka v. United States Tax Court,203
the District of Columbia Circuit held that a decision to disbar the
plaintiff without evidence that he had committed a crime did not
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Approvingly citing
Glucksberg, the court opined, “substantive due process protects
‘fundamental’ liberties that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ . . . Under
this banner, the Supreme Court has protected certain interests related
to sexuality, marriage, and family life,”204 including a same-sex couple’s
right to marry.205 The court found it “impossible to wrench from these
cases a substantive due process right to bar membership or against
unduly harsh disbarment.”206 Thus, Glucksberg survived Obergefell.
A recent district court decision citing Obergefell, Duffner v. City of
St. Peters,207 nonetheless relied on Glucksberg in concluding that
plaintiffs challenging an ordinance requiring residents to plant and
maintain turf grass on their private property failed to identify a
fundamental right restricted by the ordinance.208 And in Struniak v.
Lynch,209 the Eastern District of Virginia observed that Obergefell’s
methodology is “properly understood as a rejection of the strict
requirements of Glucksberg and an embrace of Justice Harlan’s
common law approach to implied fundamental liberty interests.”210
Determining that Obergefell did not expressly overrule Glucksberg, the
court applied both decisions in analyzing the plaintiff’s argument that
202. Id. at 466–67.
203. 854 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
204. Id. at 34 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21).
205. Id. at 35 (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599).
206. Id.; see also Van Orden v. Stringer, 937 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Glucksberg and
holding that plaintiffs’ contention that they were entitled to changes in the way state officials
conducted annual reviews of civilly-committed persons was not deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty); Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d
1283 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting prisoner did not have a protected liberty interest in not being
classified as a sex offender; per Glucksberg, the claimed right to refuse registration was not deeply
rooted); Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Glucksberg and
concluding that history and tradition did not provide a firm footing for a taxpayer’s claimed
deduction for the costs of in vitro fertilization procedures, a “decidedly modern phenomena”).
207. Duffner v. City of St. Peters, No. 4:16-CV-01971, 2018 WL 1519378 at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar.
28, 2018), aff’d, 930 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2019).
208. Id.
209. 159 F. Supp. 3d 643 (E.D. Va. 2016).
210. Id. at 667.
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a citizen has a constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable
liberty interest in residing in the United States with his or her noncitizen spouse.211 Under Glucksberg, “the analysis is simple and
straightforward . . . the nation’s history and traditions establish the
power of Congress to restrict immigrant presence in the United States
even when the immigrant is married to a United States citizen.”212
Under Obergefell, “the analysis is not much more difficult . . . the
Glucksberg analysis remains relevant, and the long history of
congressional regulation bears due consideration,” as does the absence
of a “history of impermissible animus as the basis for the restriction at
issue here.”213 Accordingly, the court held, the plaintiff did not have a
judicially protected or enforceable fundamental liberty interest.214
An Obergefellian approach to a Fifth Amendment substantive due
process suit was on display in the District of Oregon’s decision in
Juliana v. United States.215 The court considered whether environmental
activists who were too young to vote had a fundamental liberty interest
in a climate system capable of sustaining human life.216 Noting
Glucksberg’s history and tradition inquiry, the court nonetheless relied
on Obergefell’s generational liberty approach217 in concluding that
“‘new’ fundamental rights are [not] out of bounds.”218 Exercising its
“reasoned judgment,” the court had “no doubt that the right to a
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a
free and ordered society. Just as marriage is the ‘foundation of the
family,’ a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress.”219 Thus, the court held,
where a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and
substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause
human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread
damage to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically
alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process
violation. To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution

211. Id.
212. Id. at 667–68 (citation omitted).
213. Id. at 668.
214. Id.
215. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Ore. 2016), rev’d for lack of standing and remanded for
dismissal, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
216. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1234.
217. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
218. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249.
219. Id. at 1250 (quotation marks omitted).
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affords no protection against a government’s knowing decision to
poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink.
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged infringement of a fundamental
right.220

Although reversed on appeal for lack of standing,221 the court’s
decision is an interesting exemplar of the application of a generational
liberty analysis going beyond the Glucksberg approach.
Consider an additional post-Obergefell decision by the Supreme
Court of New Mexico involving the same issue of physician-assisted
suicide taken up by the Glucksberg Court in 1997. In Morris v.
Brandenburg,222 the court considered a declaratory judgment action
brought by physicians and a patient challenging the constitutionality of
a New Mexico statute criminalizing assisted suicide.223 As framed by the
court, the “question in this case is whether a mentally competent,
terminally ill patient has a constitutional right to have a willing
physician, consistent with accepted medical practices, prescribe a safe
medication that the patient may self-administer for the purpose of
peacefully ending the patient’s life.”224 “No,” answered the court,
holding that physician assistance in dying is not a fundamental or

220. Id. For additional post-Obergefell federal decisions court decisions discussing
Glucksberg, see Students & Parents for Privacy v. Sch. Dirs. of Township High Sch. Dist. 211, 377
F. Supp. 3d 891 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (noting Obergefell but relying on Glucksberg in holding that
students’ claimed right not to be seen unclothed by the opposite sex was not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 363 (E.D.
Mich. 2018) (holding that minor children’s allegations that inadequate public schools denied them
access to literacy because of their race did not violate the Due Process Clause; although noting
Obergefell’s “reasoned judgment” analysis, the court concluded that “in a case like this one, the
holding of Obergefell does not counsel a departure from” the Glucksberg approach); Ammarell
v. United States, No. 3:16-CV-00708, 2018 WL 2843441 (W.D.N.C. June 11, 2018) (noting North
Carolina tort claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation passed constitutional
muster; Glucksberg’s history-and-tradition analysis was not altered by Lawrence v. Texas, and the
alleged sexual conduct abused the institution of marriage); Robinson v. Gov’t of the District of
Columbia, 234 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2017) (claiming plaintiff’s liberty interest in possessing an
unsealed container of alcohol in public was not fundamental and protected; such possession is not
deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
as required by Glucksberg); Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d
602, 632 (E.D. Va. 2016) (noting Obergefell but holding that under Glucksberg the plaintiff’s
asserted fundamental liberty interest in engaging in bondage, discipline, dominance, submission,
sadism, and masochism is clearly not protected or judicially enforceable under the Due Process
Clause: “[t]here is no basis to conclude that tying up a willing submissive sex partner and
subjecting him or her to whipping, choking, or other forms of domination is deeply rooted in the
nation’s history and traditions or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).
221. See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175.
222. 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016).
223. Id.; see also N.M.S.A. 1978, § 30-2-4.
224. Brandenberg, 376 P.3d at 838.
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important right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.225
Brandenberg undertook a detailed discussion of the Glucksberg
formula, noting the United States Supreme Court’s call for avoiding
the transformation of liberties protected by the Due Process Clause on
the basis of the Court’s policy preferences.226 The New Mexico high
court pointed to Obergefell’s concern that defining an asserted right by
reference to historical practices was inconsistent with the Court’s
fundamentality analysis in its right to marry decisions.227 However,
Brandenberg concluded, as Obergefell did not expressly overrule
Glucksberg, the Court’s 1997 decision controlled.228 Consequently,
Obergefell’s concern with defining rights by looking to historical
practices was not pertinent to the analysis of the physician-assisted
suicide issue. Unlike the marriage cases grounded in a tradition of a
fundamental right to marry, “we do not have such a tradition to fall
back on regarding physician aid in dying.”229
The aforementioned and admittedly small sample of postObergefell cases reveal that Glucksberg not only survived but is being
employed by courts in rejecting substantive due process claims in areas
outside the physician-assisted suicide setting addressed in the Court’s
1997 decision. Apart from Juliana’s recognition of a fundamental
liberty interest in a life-sustaining climate system, the lower federal
court and New Mexico Supreme Court decisions acknowledged
Obergefell but turned to and applied Glucksberg in declining to find a
“new” (i.e., non-historical and non-traditional) fundamental right
judicially protected by and enforceable under the Due Process Clause.
Aware of the perils of prediction, it is my view that a majority of the
currently constituted Court would reject the view that Obergefell
overruled Glucksberg and that the latter decision’s history-andtradition methodology is no longer applicable to the resolution of
substantive due process issues. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito have already made clear their adherence to the
Glucksbergian traditionalist methodology in their opinions. And
statements made by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh prior to joining
the Court—in which Gorsuch criticized “reasoned judgment”
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 850.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 848; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
Brandenberg, 376 P.3d at 847.
Id. at 848.
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interpretation of the Constitution,230 and Kavanaugh observed in a
post-Obergefell speech that Glucksberg is an important precedent231—
suggests that the newest members of the Court regard Glucksberg as
still viable and governing precedent. If correct, this prediction can have
significant implications for future substantive due process cases
claiming unconstitutional governmental deprivations of liberty,
including, for example, the judicial methodology employed in deciding
challenges to alleged state denials of reproductive choice.232
CONCLUSION
The arguments that Obergefell effectively overruled Glucksberg,
“laid to waste the entire Glucksberg edifice,” and definitively replaced
the history-and-tradition test with a holistic due process inquiry233 have
not (yet) been borne out. At this juncture it appears, generally speaking,
that Obergefell’s generational approach to the meaning of protected
and protectable “liberty” interests in the same-sex marriage context
has not created a methodological sea change in substantive due process
jurisprudence. Whether and how the Court, sans Justice Kennedy, will
ultimately decide the subject addressed in this essay is an important
and intriguing question.234 But at this point the answer to the w(h)ither
Glucksberg query is that Glucksberg lives.

230. See supra note 92.
231. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
232. This obviously important issue merits further consideration beyond the scope of this
essay.
233. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
234. As is another critical question beyond the scope of this essay: whether Obergefell might
be overruled. As posited by Professor Geoffrey Stone: “In light of the vehemence of the
dissenting justices and their harsh condemnation of the legitimacy of the decision, it is certainly
possible that at some point down the road a majority of justices holding similar views might
jettison the precedent . . . .” GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION 524 (2017).

